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Google AdWords and Canadian Trademark
Law
Reed W. Taubner*
INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Internet has made advertising more efficient, connecting
sellers and potential buyers with greater precision than was ever before possible.
But, it has also led to new trademark uses that strain the laws that evolved to govern a tangible world. Google’s AdWords program is a controversial example that
allows one competitor to bid on another’s trademark — and potentially profit from
its goodwill — such that, when a user googles that mark, the results may prominently display the bidder’s website, and not necessarily that of the mark owner.
This article aims to answer two questions: should business competitors be allowed to use each other’s goodwill in this way and, if so, can trademark law police
the program without stifling competition? Part I examines the technical aspects of
the AdWords program. Part II explores the underlying rationales of trademark law
to start developing a normative position. Part III reviews the American jurisprudence and commentary to hone that normative position and to identify a compatible
legal framework. Part IV compares that framework against Canadian law.
This article endorses the work of Misha Gregory Macaw who, unlike some
trademark expansionists, argues that keying is permissible provided that it does not
confuse buyers as to source. The implications of his position are that trademark law
should apply to all instances of keying to prevent abuse, but that intervention depends on the likelihood of confusion, not simply one seller profiting from another’s
goodwill. A survey of Canadian commentary and jurisprudence suggests that Canadian trademark law is compatible with Macaw’s thesis: the tort of passing off appears well suited to disciplining trademark use on the Internet and, although some
provisions of the Trade-marks Act could be expanded to prohibit socially beneficial
uses of competing marks, Canadian courts have applied them reservedly, especially
compared to some of their American counterparts.

I. THE TECHNICAL AND COMMERCIAL BACKGROUND OF
KEYING
Search engines function by finding and indexing large numbers of websites,
which they then display according to their relevance to the user’s search. The
cofounders of Google — today’s foremost search engine — once wrote that they
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expected advertising funded search engines to be “inherently biased towards the
advertisers and away from the needs of the consumers.”1 And while Google has
indeed ascended on its reputation for delivering highly relevant search results,2 it
has not abandoned advertising as a source of revenue. Two years later, Google
launched its AdWords service,3 and now allows a seller to associate keywords with
her website for a fee, though its “biased” results are displayed separately from its
“unbiased” results.
The appeal of AdWords to sellers and to Google is straightforward. By paying
for a “sponsored link”, a seller improves her chances of attracting customers because her website may4 appear in a discrete sponsored links section rather than
buried among the organic results (i.e. those that Google selected purely based on
their relevance to the user’s query). Figure 15 shows an organic link (a Wikipedia
article), as well several sponsored links, which are labeled as such. In return for the
added publicity, the seller pays a fee every time a user clicks on her sponsored link.
In the first two years following the creation of AdWords, Google enjoyed tripledigit growth, which one author attributes to the importance of the program to
Google’s business model.6

1

2

3
4
5

6

Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web
Search Engine (1998) [unpublished] at 18, online: Stanford University InfoLab
<http://infolab.stanford.edu/pub/papers/google.pdf>.
See e.g. Misha Gregory Macaw, “Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.: A Justification for the Use of Trademarks as Keywords to Trigger Paid Advertising Placements in Internet Search Engine Results” (2005) 32 Rutgers Computer
& Tech. L.J. 1 at 5-6 (Legal Trac)[footnotes omitted]:
In general, search engines treat the specific algorithms by which information is gathered and results are returned as highly proprietary and
confidential. For example, the high popularity of Google’s search engine often is attributed to a perception by Internet users that Google’s
algorithm returns particularly relevant results.
Patrick F. Nevins, “Is Google Doing Evil With Trademarks?” (2007) 40 Conn. Law
Rev. 247 at 255.
Whether and where a sponsored link appears is discussed below.
Figure 1 is the product of searching for “sunglasses” from a computer in Kingston,
Ontario. Today, search engines consider the location of the user in determining which
results to display. This is obviously the case here as the top sponsored result is
Canadian.
Yu Lim, “Can Google Be Liable for Trademark Infringement?: A look at the ‘Trademark Use’ Requirement as Applied to Google AdWords” (2007) UCLA Ent. L. Rev.
265 at 270. In 2004, virtually all of the company’s revenue came from advertising
income, one half of which was earned through AdWords, ibid. at 269.
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To sponsor a link, a seller must first choose the keyword or keywords she
would like to associate with her website. In North America, Google does not prevent one from choosing a trademark, although it does sometimes7 indicate trademarked keywords with a “TM.” Google also actively suggests related search terms.
Figure 2 displays the results of an AdWords request for the keyword “walkman.”

Bidding for a keyword does not give a seller an exclusive right to use that
keyword. Instead, it indicates the maximum price the seller is willing to pay each

7

See e.g. Figure 2 where AdWords indicates that “walkman” is a trademark, but neither
“sony” (registration # TMA283411) nor “ericsson” (registration # TMA419046) is labeled as such.
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time a user clicks on her sponsored link. As shown in Figure 3, Google provides an
estimate of how close to the top a sponsored link will be displayed for a given bid.8

Google determines which sponsored links to display and in what order based
on “Ad Rank”, a complex and somewhat opaque figure produced by multiplying
the “Quality Score” of the seller’s site by her keyword bid.9 A site’s Quality Score
is comprised of its click through rate10 (the single most important factor according
to Patrick Nevins11), the click through rates of the seller’s other sponsored links,

8

9

10
11

For the keyword “walkman”, a maximum bid of $0.10 per click would likely place the
seller’s sponsored link in the 4–6 range. A maximum bid of $1 per click, on the other
hand, would likely put the seller’s link in the 1–3 range. It is also apparent that more
popular keywords cost more. For a top spot using the keyword “coke”, for example,
one would likely have to bid $3.10 per click.
Google:
“How
are
ads
ranked?”,
online:
AdWords
Help
<http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6111>
[Google:
Ranked].
It is the ratio of how many times a user has clicked on a given sponsored link compared
to how many times that link has been displayed in total.
Supra note 3 at 255.
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the relevance of the keyword to the link, etc.12 The amount the seller must actually
pay per click is calculated as follows: [(Ad Rank / Quality Score) + $0.01].13 The
most desirable position for a sponsored link appears to be directly above the organic results (e.g. LensCrafters in Figure 1). According to Google:
Only ads that exceed a certain Quality Score and CPC [cost per click] bid
threshold may appear in these positions. If the three highest-ranked ads all
surpass these thresholds, then they’ll appear in order above the search results. If one or more of these ads don’t meet the thresholds, then the next
highest-ranked ad that does will be allowed to show above the search
results.14

In other words, for a top spot, a high Ad Rank is not enough; a high-quality
website with a low bid may not suffice, and the same goes for a low-quality website with a high bid. In fact, it would appear that a website with a lower Ad Rank
could surpass a website with a higher Ad Rank if only the former met the minimum
threshold set by Google.

II. THE UNDERLYING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
(a) The Nature of Sponsored Results
Unlike other search engines that order sponsored links purely according to
what the seller paid, Google also has an eye for quality.15 Because of the way a
sponsored link’s Quality Score is calculated (see above), both its placement and
cost depend on whether the keyword is related to the link, whether users have actually taken an interest in the link in the past, and whether the seller has a history of
buying useful advertisements. Therefore, if an earphone company bought the
keyword “ipod”, its fairly relevant link would be more likely to appear (and appear
prominently) among the sponsored results than that of an unrelated adult entertainment company that had bought the same keyword, hoping to benefit from Apple’s
goodwill. The earphone company would also be charged less per click, further encouraging relevancy. Yu Lim goes so far as to say “Google’s model places advertisers with deeper pockets on equal footing with those advertisers that generate the
greatest number of hits and doesn’t just give priority to those advertisers who generate the most revenue. . . .”16
This assessment can be qualified, however. In a contest between two sponsored links of equal quality, the seller with the deeper pockets would win because
the product of its quality score and the seller’s bid determines an ad’s display position. Moreover, to compete for the most prized spot above the organic results,
pockets of a certain depth are a prerequisite and can, in fact, propel a sponsored

12
13

14
15
16

Google: Ranked, supra note 9.
Google: “How much do I pay for a click on my ad on a search page? What about if my
ad
is
the
only
one
showing?”,
online:
AdWords
Help
<http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=87411&topic=10264>.
Google: Ranked, supra note 9.
Lim, supra note 6 at 268.
Ibid. at 269.
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link ahead of another of superior quality.17 AdWords is dualistic; on the one hand,
it permits certain efficiencies (the user finds earphones, and they may be a better
deal than those offered by Apple) yet, on the other hand, the sponsored results are
not based purely on relevancy, but also on the relative size of competing sellers’
bids. Of course, there is also the risk that highly relevant websites are not even in
the running because their owners failed to bid at all. It is the normal state of the
business world that those with deeper pockets have an advertising advantage. AdWords is different, though, because it allows the deep pocketed to outgun their
competitors using the latter’s own trademarks.

(b) The Traditional Rationales of Trademark Law: A Normative Guide
To use another seller’s trademark as a metatag or Google keyword is certainly
to gain benefit from that user’s goodwill. But, is it legal? Many American commentators emphasize that the trademark regime in the United States does not grant full
property rights in trademarks, and they are very wary of extending to a trademark
holder wholesale control of the language of which her trademark is composed.18
On this basis, some argue that any use of a trademark that is not to identify the
source of a good or service should be allowed,19 which is often the case of
metatags and sponsored links. In a similar vein, Mark Bartholomew writes:
The copyright fair use defense protects those who would use copyrighted
materials for what are seen as socially desirable ends or for purposes that
pose no threat to the incentives for artistic creation. Trademark law is no
different. . . . Trademark fair use defenses shield non-mark holders from liability when trademarks are used in a purely descriptive sense.20

In Canada, too, the traditional view has been that the bundle of rights that
trademark offers is more limited than that of tangible property. The Exchequer
Court once said, “There is . . . only in a limited sense a property in a trade-mark.
. . . Property in a word mark itself cannot exist, but property in that word does exist
when applied to goods which go into the market.”21 Similarly, when a seller sues a
competitor who used her trademark for passing off, it is not harm to any property

17

18

19
20

21

Nevins, supra note 3 at 254-55, is also more skeptical than Lim, but on different
ground — he believes that, by sorting its results rather than displaying them passively,
Google is performing a disservice to users in favor of its advertisers. This issue is explored in Part III.
See e.g. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, “Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet” (2004) 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777 at 788 — “trademark rights are not
property rights in gross, but limited entitlements to protect against uses that diminish
the informative value of marks.”
See Nevins, supra note 3 at 265.
Mark Bartholomew, “Making a Mark in the Internet Economy: A Trademark Analysis
of Search Engine Advertising” (2005) Okla. L. Rev. 179 at 207-208 [footnotes
omitted].
Williamson Candy Co. v. W. J. Crothers Co., [1924] Ex. C.R. 183 (Can. Ex. Ct.); affirmed [1925] S.C.R. 377, ¶8 (S.C.C.). The case arose when a confectionary maker in
Kingston, Ontario tried to trademark “Oh Henry” after seeing a chocolate bar by that
name at a Chicago tradeshow.
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right that gives rise to a remedy, but rather the threat that any misrepresentation on
the competitor’s part poses to the seller’s business or goodwill.22 According to the
traditional view,23 to merely invoke another’s trademark and benefit from the
goodwill attached is not enough; there must also be a risk of skewing the story that
the mark tells, sending misinformation that could diminish its goodwill or divert
sales to a competitor posing as the mark owner.
If users came to believe that AdWord’s sponsored links were owned by, or
affiliated with the trademark owner whose mark had triggered them, the resulting
confusion would distort that mark’s story, which is impermissible according to the
traditional rationales underlying trademark law, which include:
1) reducing buyer search costs and otherwise protecting the buyer from
deception,
2) encouraging the production of known quality goods and services, and
3) encouraging competition.
Most authors do not dispute the above rationales,24 and they offer a suitable normative guide for the purposes of this article: if these are the benefits trademarks have
to offer the market, the law should not permit trademark uses that would prevent
them from doing so. Confusion as to source or endorsement is disruptive because
buyers lose faith in the stories marks tell them. As a result, mark owners have less
of an incentive to ensure the quality of their wares because they are less able to
reap the rewards on the market, which also reduces the competitive drive between
them.
Some authors suggest that the law should also prevent the diminution of the
goodwill that has accumulated in a trademark because of the effort and expense the

22
23

24

Star Industrial Co. v. Yap Kwee Kor, [1976] F.S.R. 256 at 269 (P.C.).
Much to the chagrin of some authors, however, some more recent rulings challenge the
traditional conception of what a trademark is. See e.g. Canada Safeway Ltd. v.
Manitoba Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 832 (1983), 73 C.P.R. (2d) 234
(Man. C.A.), at para. 12 (WL) [Safeway] (“The union attempts to justify use of the
insignia on the ground it is engaged in a bona fide labour dispute. Even if that were so,
I do not understand how appropriation of an element of the company’s goodwill is
justifiable. . . . [T]here is no right under the guise of free speech to take or use what
does not belong to the defendant”); see generally Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural
Life of Intellectual Properties (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998) at 67ff. As
discussed below, many commentators complain that this perceived expansion of trademark protections is particularly grievous with respect to the Internet. Many others willingly accept it.
Some authors contest these rationales. See e.g. Coombe, supra note 23 at 60ff: Writing
in the American context, she argues that trademark law demonstrates “more regard for
the exchange value of signifying forms than for the protection of the consuming public.” For example, another rationale has been forwarded — protecting a mark’s goodwill from dilution — which the courts have accepted. This new rationale, Coombe
says, denies the fact that trademarks are social constructs to which an individual or
business association cannot give meaning alone. See Contra William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, “Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective” (1987) 30 J.L. &
Econ. 265.
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owner incurred to attract it.25 This argument is part of a greater movement toward
expanding the depth of protection trademark law has to offer.26 Trademark investment is certainly a difficult task and one that should be facilitated, but it is a derivative goal and not an end unto itself. Goodwill is (in a sense) the volume with which
a trademark tells its story, thereby protecting buyers, directing them to the goods
they want, and encouraging quality control and competition between sellers. Without these functions, there would be no reason for the law to facilitate the accumulation of goodwill in the first place. If the law took trademark investment (i.e. the
accumulation of goodwill) as its end goal, one could argue that it would be inequitable for a third party to ever benefit from that investment, a notion that has gained
some traction,27 but that this article rejects, as have Canadian courts in refusing to
recognize the tort of misappropriation (see below). As Bartholomew puts it, “much
of the competition in the marketplace that is considered beneficial is based in part
on freeriding.”28 The law should allow any third party trademark use that does not
threaten the end goals of the trademark regime, which is more consistent with the
traditional view that a trademark offers only limited property rights. It follows that
the law should prevent trademark uses that undermine a mark’s goodwill if doing
so would render that mark’s story less true, or a true story less audible.29

III. AMERICAN COMMENTARY AND JURISPRUDENCE
(a) The Legislative Background of the American Debate
The bulk of American commentary is focused on the question of whether keying constitutes trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. With respect to registered trademarks, section 32(1) reads:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use

25

26
27
28
29

See e.g. Nevins, supra note 3 at 271:
[T]he symbolic functions of trademarks have expanded over the years,
and perhaps trademark policing should recognize that trademarks are
no longer considered merely as public identifiers of sources whose
sole purpose is to be affixed to the goods or services they represent.
. . . Trademarks are no longer only being utilized as a function of
speech from the source to the consumer, but also are used as also [sic]
a function of the consumer’s speech to the company. Companies
purchasing keyword queries are free-riding on the strength of the connection between the consumer and the mark owner. . . .
See e.g. Coombe, supra note 23 at 53, 61.
See e.g. Safeway, supra note 23.
Supra note 20 at 200.
The corollary is also arguable: the law should not prevent reductions in goodwill that
result in a mark’s story becoming more true, or its false story less audible. So long as
the stories told are accurate, there will be an incentive to invest in trademarks without
sweetening the deal by giving mark owners wholesale ownership of the language of
which their marks are composed.
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is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be
liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.30

Section 43(a) says something similar with respect to unregistered trademarks
for a finding of infringement on the part of the defendant. Both essentially require:
1) “use” of the trademark by the defendant
2) that use must have been in “commerce”,31 and
3) that use in commerce must be “likely to cause confusion.”32
Although less emphasized by the courts and commentators with respect to
keying, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act also contains a more general prohibition — one that goes beyond merely confusing — against a “use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”33

(b) Survey of the Available American Jurisprudence
The Internet has enabled several new forms of advertising that frequently involve the use of trademarks belonging to third parties. The most important today is
keying, but older forms have given rise to influential jurisprudence, such as the use
of metatags.34 Because the cases to which these ads give rise — regardless of
type — generally consider the same legal issues and draw heavily from one another, the type of ad involved need only be called to attention where relevant. Appendix A shows one possible way in which the relevant cases can be organized.
The cases mostly share an analytical framework, considering:
1) whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s mark in commerce, and
2) if so, whether there is a likelihood of confusion,35 or
30
31
32
33
34

35

15 U.S.C. §1114 (2003) [Lanham Act][emphasis added].
The in “commerce” requirement provides a jurisdictional basis for the Lanham Act; it
refers to commerce federally regulated by Congress — Macaw, supra note 2 at 13.
Macaw, ibid at 11.
Supra note 30, §1125(c).
In determining the relevancy of a given website, a search engine considers not only the
website’s visible text, but also elements of its code that are invisible to the user, known
as metatags. In an early form of Internet advertising, sellers (particularly the sellers of
adult entertainment products and services) made their websites appear more relevant to
search engines by incorporating often indescriptive metatags. The practice led to irrelevant search results. As search engines became more sophisticated, they began to give
less weight to metatags, the effectiveness of which as advertising tools sharply declined — Andrew Goodman, “An End to Metatags: Enough Already” (2002) [unpublished], online: Traffick <http://www.traffick.com/article.asp?aID=102>.
The courts assess the likelihood of confusion using a multifactor test, such as that in
AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F. 2d 341 (9th Cir., 1979) at 348–54 [Sleekcraft] — the
test considers:
1)
the strength of the mark (i.e. distinctiveness),
2)
the relatedness of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods,
3)
the similarity of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks,
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3) whether the use is an instance of nominative fair use36 (i.e. whether the
defendant was justified in using the plaintiff’s trademark to identify or
describe the plaintiff’s wares).
The latter determination is made using the New Kids test, which the Ninth Circuit
has said should replace the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely in cases of
comparative advertising — that is, where Seller A invokes Seller B’s trademark,
not to pass off her goods as someone else’s, but to compare them.37
The jurisprudence can be divided into two camps: the cases that would expand
trademark law, and the cases with more traditional outlooks. One line of cases dealing with keying, metatags, and trademark-triggered popups (see Appendix A beginning with Playboy Entertainment v. Welles)38 found that such advertisements did
not constitute infringement under the Lanham Act. They generally did so by finding
that the defendant had not “used” the plaintiff’s mark for the purposes of the Act,
citing factors such as (i) the ads were visibly distinct from the plaintiff’s website,39
(ii) the ads did not impede the user from visiting the plaintiff’s website,40 and (iii)
the fact that the plaintiff’s trademark was not actually affixed to any wares.41

4)
5)
6)

36

37

38
39
40
41

the evidence of actual confusion,
whether there is evidence of actual confusion,
whether the defendant and plaintiff sell through the same marketing channels (e.g. in the same stores),
7)
the amount of care the buyer is likely to exercise given the nature of the
good (e.g. impulse purchases versus those made after great deliberation),
8)
the defendant’s intent (“When the alleged infringer knowingly adopts a
mark similar to another’s, reviewing courts presume that the defendant can
accomplish his purpose: that is, that the public will be deceived”), and
9)
the likelihood that either party will expand its business such that it competes
with the other.
The standard test applied to possible instance of nominative fair use was developed by
the Ninth Circuit in the case of New Kids On The Block v. New America Publishing,
971 F. 2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) at 308 [New Kids] — use of another seller’s trademark is
legal where: 1) the product or service is not easily identified without use of the plaintiff’s trademark, 2) the mark is only used to the extent that is reasonably necessary to
identify said product or services, and 3) the defendant must have done nothing to suggest sponsorship on the part of the plaintiff.
Playboy Entertainment v. Welles, 279 F. 3d 796 (9th Cir., 2002) at 801 [Welles]:
The three-factor test better evaluates the likelihood of confusion in
nominative use cases. When a defendant uses a trademark nominally,
the trademark will be identical to the plaintiff’s mark . . . [and] application of the Sleekcraft test . . . would lead to the incorrect conclusion
that virtually all nominative uses are confusing.
Ibid.
U-Haul International v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va., 2003) at 727-28
[U-Haul].
Wells Fargo v. When U.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich., 2003) at 758–62 [Wells
Fargo].
Rescuecom v. Google, 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y., 2006) at 403 [Rescuecom].
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Another line of cases (see Appendix A beginning with Brookfield
Communications v. West Coast Entertainment),42 however, was much more willing
to find that online advertising constituted “use” under the Lanham Act, and most
did so emphasizing that the defendant had free ridden on the plaintiff’s goodwill.43
With respect to confusion, some were willing to grant injunctions,44 or at least
deny the defendant summary judgment,45 based only on initial interest confusion — a species or element of confusion originating on the Ninth Circuit where
the buyer is initially confused as to the source or endorsement of a good, but resolves said confusion before the time of purchase. These expansionist courts seem
to have considered it actionable, per se, because it may lead a buyer initially attracted by Seller A’s trademark to become interested and ultimately purchase Seller
B’s wares instead.46 Others performed a multifactor test for confusion (e.g. the
Sleekcraft test)47 as they would for a case originating in the physical world, but
even they considered initial interest confusion separately, and some seemed to
think it could be the determinative issue.48
Unfortunately, no case nor article reviewed for this article seriously considers
liability based on dilution per section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, likely because the
courts have generally said either, in traditionalist cases, that it was not at issue because there had been no “use”,49 or, in expansionist cases, that the matter had to go
to trial — the results of which we do not have.50

(c) American Commentary
Nevins states that the main schism between authors pertains to whether keying
and older forms of Internet advertising in fact “use” trademarks,51 which would
appear to be the same issue on which the courts split. The divide is perhaps more
fundamental. It may be better characterized as one between authors who adopt the

42
43

44
45
46

47
48
49
50
51

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir., 1999) [Brookfield].
See e.g. Playboy Entertainment v. Netscape Communication, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.,
2004) at 1025 [Netscape]; Government Employees Insurance v. Google, 330 F. Supp.
2d 700 (E.D. Va., 2004) at 704 [Geico]; Google v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, 2005 WL 832398 (N.D. Cal., 2005) at 5 [American Blind]; 800-JR Cigar v.
GoTo.com, 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J., 2006) at 285 [JR].
See e.g. Brookfield, supra note 42 at 1057.
See e.g. American Blind, supra note 43 at 5.
Netscape, supra note 43 at 1025 [footnotes omitted]:
Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest in a competitor’s product. Although dispelled before an actual
sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the
goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark
infringement.
Supra note 35.
See e.g. Netscape, supra note 43 at 1026–29; JR, supra note 43 at 292.
See e.g. Rescuecom, supra note 41 at 404.
See e.g. JR, supra note 43 at 294.
Supra note 3 at 264.
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more traditional view that trademarks impart limited property rights, and those who
seek to expand the law to prohibit trademark uses that benefit from the goodwill
that has accumulated in another’s mark, even where those uses have not caused
confusion or disrupted the mark’s ability to tell its story.

(i) Competing Approaches to “Use”
Nevins vehemently disagrees with “use theorists”, who he says would prevent
the court from even considering confusion by arguing that the alleged trademark
use is not of the sort the Lanham Act requires for registration, and therefore cannot
constitute infringement.52 He would prefer a tailored definition of “use” based on a
purposive reading of the Lanham Act to cope with infringement cases involving
novel mark uses.53 By contrast, Macaw looks to the definition of a trademark —
something (words in this case) used to “identify and distinguish”54 one’s goods —
to define for the purposes of infringement a “use” as something that is perceptible
to the user.55 Despite their differences, however, both Nevins and Macaw agree, in
contrast with the traditionalist courts, that buying someone’s trademark as a
keyword constitutes “use” for the purposes of the Lanham Act. Macaw, whom one
might have expected to believe otherwise, reasons that:
[C]onsumers perceive American Blind’s trademark upon entering it as a
keyword into the Google search engine in the first place. . . . [I]n using the
trademark entered by the user as a keyword to return search results, Google
is using the trademark to create an association in the consumer’s mind between the trademark — as perceived by the user upon entry into the search
engine — and the search results returned.56

The “use” debate is relevant for two reasons. First, Nevins argues that drawing
from a trademark’s goodwill can constitute “use” without any perceptible signaling.
Macaw, on the other hand, believes that trademark law is being expanded too far
when it comes to the Internet, and trademark law — because it primarily concerns
the signaling function marks perform — should only intervene where the use is perceptible.57 The distinction is essentially one of policy. Nevins is willing to scrutinize a use that he does not necessarily consider perceptible, even though trademark
law would not have traditionally done so (how can a use distort a mark’s story if it
goes unperceived?). Although Macaw would also scrutinize keying, he is willing to
do so because he believes that it falls within the traditional gambit of trademark
law. In short, Nevins believes that a trademark potentially offers more expansive
protections than Macaw does, and the widening divide between them is discussed
in the next section. Second, the debate is relevant because it highlights the desirability of Macaw’s approach: although his position is more traditional than that of
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Similar reasoning is visible in the WhenU.com cases (see Appendix A), and
Rescuecom, supra note 41 at 400.
Supra note 3 at 268-69.
Supra note 3 at 254.
Supra note 2 at 12.
Supra note 2 at 47.
Supra note 2 at 27.
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Nevins, he would not go so far as some “use theorists”, who would prevent the
courts from disciplining misbehaved competitors entirely. This idea is also developed later on.

(ii) Competing Approaches to “Confusion”
With respect to confusion, Nevins and Macaw disagree on the relative importance of initial interest confusion, a factor frequently invoked by expansionist
courts. Nevins seems to argue that initial interest confusion ought to be actionable,
per se, and he supports trademark owners pursuing such actions in defense of the
goodwill they have accumulated in their marks.58 By contrast, Macaw views initial
interest confusion not as a self-contained cause of action, as some authors and
courts have, but as simply an element of the greater confusion analysis, and argues
that literal59 confusion is a prerequisite of infringement.60
With respect to the alternative nominative fair use defense, Nevins, like Macaw, agrees that the doctrine is available, but Nevins mentions it to lend weight to
his argument that the use issue should not bar keying infringement analyses.61 Macaw, however, explicitly supports using trademarks to make comparisons between
two sellers’ wares, which encourages competition. He argues that the nominative
fair use doctrine permits such uses.62 He also preempts those who might argue that
generic terms should be used to reference the good or service in question based on
the New Kids test,63 which only allows use of a mark where identification of the
good or service would be difficult otherwise. He explains:
[T]his view ignores the fact that it is essentially impossible to make any
legally supportable inferences about consumer search objectives based on
their selection of keywords. Factors contributing to this phenomenon include[s] . . . the wide range of possible objectives a consumer may have
when conducting a search. On this . . . point in particular, trademarks may
often be used in keywords as a proxy for identifying the types of goods or
services for which the consumer is seeking information.64
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60
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64

See e.g. supra note 3 at 271:
[T]he symbolic functions of trademarks have expanded over the years.
. . . This is a result of considerable investment on the part of the trademark owner, and perhaps consideration of goodwill should be given
greater emphasis by trademark law in the future.
Similar reasoning is visible in the expansionistic cases like Brookfield, supra note 42,
Netscape, supra note 43, and their progeny.
Macaw uses the word “actual” to mean significant, enduring confusion, as oppose to
initial interest confusion. But this term is confusing because only a likelihood of confusion is necessary under American law. Therefore, this article uses the term “literal confusion” to capture the same idea.
Supra note 2 at 49. See e.g. Brookfield, supra note 42 at 1057; Netscape, supra note 43
at 1026–29.
Supra note 3 at 268.
Supra note 2 at 58.
Supra note 36 at 308.
Supra note 2 at 54-55 [footnotes omitted].
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(d) The Authors’ Conclusions and the Best Approach for Canada
Nevins’s analysis is narrowly focused on a single vision of buyer-seller interaction: a seller that has invested in her trademark, and a buyer hoping to find that
seller by searching for her mark. In his view, when buyers search for a mark, “they
already know what they want to find and from whom . . . [otherwise they] would
submit a query containing a generic mark.”65 For him, search engines that tempt
these goal-oriented users with related but unsolicited ads based on the trademarks
for which they had searched make an objectionable use of those marks’ goodwill.66
Macaw focuses on a different sort of user: one who does not know exactly
what she seeks. He gives the example of a user who wants a particular type of
good, but who only knows it by one trademarked name and has no desire for that
brand in particular; by searching for the mark she does know, the user can find a
variety of goods of the type she wants, and some may be more to her liking than the
brand for which she searched.67 Of course, there are many other users who may
search for a trademark without necessarily wanting to visit the owner’s website,
such as those looking for product reviews, or even outright criticisms of the mark
owner’s goods or services. Macaw argues that AdWords is essentially comparative
advertising — a boon to both consumers and market as a whole as far as it promotes competition — which is not prohibited by the Lanham Act and which is encouraged by he nominative fair use doctrine, provided that the sponsored link does
not cause confusion.68
Macaw falls in the middle of the spectrum and, as is often the case when intelligent people with divergent views debate, the strongest position lies somewhere in
between their ideals. Yu Lim occupies one pole and can more easily be described
as a “use theorist” per Nevins’s nomenclature. Like Macaw, she opposes trademark
expansionism and supports comparative advertising.69 However, she does not consider AdWords to “use” trademarks, regardless of the confusion they create.70 Nevins, of course, is closer to the opposite pole, and sees the protection of trademark
investment as a goal worthy of protection unto itself. Macaw, meanwhile lies somewhere in between.
Macaw’s position is the most compatible with the normative goals set out
above. By disallowing confusion, but allowing AdWords to facilitate comparison,
his approach encourages competition between sellers, which tends to promote product and service quality as well. Despite Nevins’s assertion that sponsored results
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Supra note 3 at 270.
Ibid. at 271.
Supra note 2 at 55.
Macaw, supra note 2 at 57, concludes that AdWords would constitute nominative fair
use if its sponsored links were labeled clearly enough so as to not cause confusion,
satisfying the third requirement of the New Kids test, supra note 36 at 308 (i.e. that the
seller do nothing to suggest sponsorship by the mark holder). The more contentious
first requirement (i.e. that the plaintiff’s mark not be used where reference to the product or service in question would be easy without it) is addressed above.
Supra note 6 at 279, 276.
Ibid. at 283.
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create “noise” that can hinder users looking for marker owner sites,71 AdWords
may actually lower search costs: recall that Google ranks its sponsored results not
only according to advertiser bid, but also according to quality. Therefore, entirely
irrelevant sponsored links are unlikely to be featured prominently, and many users
may actually find those that do appear useful. In a sense, AdWords is a self-regulating market for user attention. As Macaw points out, not all users hope to actually
find the seller who owns the trademark they googled,72 and the sponsored links
may serve as useful guides.
Nevins, of course, also objects on a more fundamental level to one seller free
riding on another’s goodwill. As the above aims to illustrate, such free riding is not
objectionable (and is potentially desirable) so long as it is not confusing. Free riding may be permissible even where it reduces the target’s goodwill — for example,
where searching for the keyword “iphone” leads to a scathing review of Apple
products. Such information is valuable to the market and access to it should not be
denied by granting trademark owners complete control over the language of which
their marks are composed. Of course, sponsored links cannot legally promote falsehoods about other sellers, but the law of torts generally (e.g. defamation) should
govern such conduct, not the tort of passing off, nor the provisions of trademark
legislation pertaining to confusion and depreciation.

IV. MACAW APPLIED TO CANADA
This article does not attempt to predict how Canadian courts will ultimately
rule on keying, or whether it is in fact confusing. Even in the United States, where
there is some jurisprudence available, this is unclear. Nor does it attempt to apportion potential liability between Goggle and the sellers that use its AdWords program. Instead, the following is an assessment of whether Canadian law is compatible with the approach that Macaw advocates — that is, one where keying is
regulated by either common law or statute, but where it is permissible so long as it
is not confusing. In Canada, “(i) whether the reference to a keyword which is a
trade-mark constitutes trade-mark use, and (ii) whether such reference results in
confusion to the user” have already been identified as the key issues the courts will
have to address73 — precisely the same issues with which the Americans are grappling. As a result, both American commentary and judicial reasoning are readily
exportable to the Canadian context.
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Supra note 3 at 270-271.
Because Macaw has a broader understanding of the role trademarks play in today’s
society and economy, one that is not entirely alien to the belief of Coombe, supra note
24, that trademarks are social constructs and cannot be owned wholesale, he is less apt
to support their commodification.
Sheldon Burshtein, “Sale of keywords causes trade-mark disputes for search engines”
(24 November 2006) The Lawyer’s Weekly (QL).
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(a) Keying and the Common Law
(i) Misappropriation
Keying, as previously discussed, may strike some as being, prima facie, unfair. The American courts have been more willing to prohibit so-called unfair competition. In the landmark case of International News Service v. Associated Press,
for example, the United States Supreme Court recognized a tort of misappropriation that prohibits Seller A from profiting from Seller B’s property (or quasi-property as was the case in INS) in a way that damages Seller B and is contrary to
good conscience.74 The tort of misappropriation seems well suited to policing the
free riding of third-party goodwill over the Internet because it is premised on the
principle that “he who has fairly paid the price should have the beneficial use of the
property”;75 but it also runs opposed to Macaw’s thesis because it would appear
that consumer confusion is not a prerequisite.76 Fortunately, the tort of misappropriation has never gained traction in other common law jurisdictions. Westfair
Foods Ltd. v. Jim Pattison Industries Ltd.77 is illustrative of the Canadian approach, which is to rely on the tort of passing off to protect trademark owners,
expanding the common law only reluctantly to avoid curtailing competition.

(ii) Classic Passing Off
If the common law is to police keying, it seems it must do so through the tort
of passing off. As it turns out, the traditional Canadian means of regulating trademark competition is preferable to misappropriation because passing off is premised
on the potential for buyer confusion as to source.78 As expressed by the English
Court of Appeal, it is founded on the notion that:
[N]o man is entitled to represent his goods as being the goods of another
man; and no man is permitted to use any mark, sign or symbol, device or
other means, whereby, without making a direct false representation himself
to a purchaser who purchases from him, he enables such purchaser to tell a
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75
76

77
78

248 U.S. 215 (1918) at 239-40 [INS].
Ibid. at 240.
It is also important to note that in INS, ibid., the court partly based its ruling on the
harm done to Seller B. As discussed above, keying serves comparative functions, some
of which do not divert potential customers away from trademarks owners, causing
them no loss. In such cases, misappropriation may be inapplicable in any event.
(1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 46 (B.C. S.C.); affirmed (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (B.C.
C.A.).
See e.g. Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583
(S.C.C.), at 601 (“attention should be drawn to the fact that the passing off rule is
founded upon the tort of deceit, and while the original requirement of an intent to
deceive died out in the mid-1800’s, there remains the requirement, at the very least,
that confusion in the minds of the public be a likely consequence”); Ciba-Geigy
Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 1992 CarswellOnt 1007, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.) at
para. 64 (WL) [Ciba-Geigy] — “There is no question that confusion, which is the essence of the tort of passing-off, must be avoided in the minds of all customers.”
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lie or to make a false representation to somebody else who is the ultimate
customer.79

Passing off strikes a balance. On the one hand, it facilitates competition by
offering trademark owners only limited protection. As the above passage illustrates,
merely benefiting from another’s goodwill or even undermining it cannot replace
likely confusion for the purposes of passing off, a rule that is consistent with Macaw’s thesis.80 Moreover, a clear disclaimer precluding any relationship between
two sellers can dispel the risk of confusion.81
That being said, the protection that passing off provides trademark owners
may be broad enough to deal with the rigors of Internet commerce, even though the
tort is more than a century old. Although AdWords considers the geographic location of the sponsor in determining the relevance of a given sponsored link, users
frequently face links from abroad. Canadian courts have held that, if Seller A is
from another country, but her mark (or specific indicia) has accumulated goodwill
in Canada, she can sue Seller B operating in Canada for passing itself off as Seller
A; there is no actual use requirement.82 Of course, as discussed above, trademarked
keywords are not only used to suggest source, and even if the two sellers carry on
business in completely different fields, Seller B can create confusion by suggesting
some sort of endorsement on the part of Seller A. Canadian courts have also held
these to be passing off.83
One might doubt whether passing off applies to keying. As the Supreme Court
of Canada laid out in Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., its prerequisites are:
1) the existence of goodwill (specifically, goodwill in the market where
the tort is alleged to have occurred),
2) deception of the public due to a misrepresentation, and
3) actual or potential damage to the plaintiff.84
The second requirement would pose the largest obstacle if it served to filter out
cases before courts had the opportunity to consider the potential for confusion, a
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Singer Manufacturing. v. Loog (1880), 18 Ch. D. 395 (Eng. C.A.); affirmed (1882), 8
App. Cas. 15 at 412-13 (H.L.).
The geographic scope of common law passing off is also limited. Its protection only
extends to where the plaintiff’s trademark has earned a reputation and goodwill; passing off affords a trademark owner no control over the language of which her mark is
comprised where her products and services are unknown and, therefore, where they
cannot possibly be confused with those of another seller.
See e.g. National Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. (1992), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d)
27 (B.C. S.C.); additional reasons at (1993), 1993 CarswellBC 642 (B.C. S.C.); affirmed (1995), 1995 CarswellBC 15 (B.C. C.A.); affirmed (1995), 1995 CarswellBC
14 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 47–55 (WL).
See e.g. Walt Disney Productions v. Triple Five Corp. (1994), 53 C.P.R. (3d) 129
(Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (1994), 1994 CarswellAlta 956 (S.C.C.), at paras.
66-67 (WL)[Walt Disney]; Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Pestco Co. of Canada (1985),
19 D.L.R. (4th) 90 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 46ff (WL).
See e.g. Walt Disney, ibid. at para. 90.
Supra note 78 at para. 33.
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problem akin to the “use” debate in the United States. Where a trademark-keyword
actually appears in the text of the sponsored link (see e.g. Figure 1, “Sunglasses” in
the LensCrafters sponsored link), the text would certainly qualify as a misrepresentation if it were confusing as to source or sponsorship. However, if the trademark is
entirely imperceptible (as is the case with metatags) or the user only sees that mark
when she herself enters it into the search engine (as is the case with AdWords
where the sponsored link does not contain the mark, although Macaw does consider
this to be a perceptible use), can this qualify as a misrepresentation on the part of
the seller or Google? The few Canadian courts that have considered the subject
have suggested that it can.
In Pandi v. FieldOfWebs.com,85 the court commented in obiter that it would
have ordered an injunction prohibiting the defendant’s “objectionable meta tags”,
which used the plaintiff’s trademark, had the defendant still been using them at the
time of the trial.86 In the more widely cited BCAA case,87 the British Columbia
Supreme Court held that one of the defendant’s websites that used the plaintiff’s
trademarks as metatags in what the court considered a deliberate attempt to mislead
users did constitute a misrepresentation for the purposes of passing off.88 By contrast, however, even though another of the defendant’s sites had similar metatags,
and even though users looking for the plaintiff’s site would likely find that site as a
result, the defendant’s second site did not constitute passing off: there was no actual confusion — a key factor to be considered, although not strictly a requirement
of passing off89 — because a “brief look” at the defendant’s second site, which
contained a clear disclaimer, made it clear that it was not affiliated with the plaintiff.90 Therefore, it would seem that Canadian courts have a broad understanding of
what constitutes a “misrepresentation” and are willing to consider the potential for
confusion, an approach that is compatible with Macaw’s thesis, rather than filtering
cases at a preliminary stage as some American courts have done.
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(2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 4389 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 5260 (Ont. S.C.J.) (WL). The plaintiffs whose business was the sale of adult
“footed pajamas” over the Internet sued their website developer, which had launched a
competing footed pajama business, in part for using the plaintiff’s fanciful domain
name — “Jumpin Jammerz” — as a metatag on its own site. By the time the matter
reached the court, the defendants had removed the offending metatags.
Ibid. at paras. 41–43.
British Columbia Automobile Assn. v. O.P.E.I.U., Local 378, 2001 BCSC 156, 85
B.C.L.R. (3d) 302 (B.C. S.C.) [BCAA].
Ibid. at para. 212. More troubling, however, was that the court made this comment
despite having found no evidence of confusion.
Ibid. at para. 132. It may seem that misrepresentation without confusion is contrary to
Macaw’s thesis, but he objects to the prohibition of bonda fide trademark uses without
confusion, not those intended to deceive. An overzealous court could stretch misrepresentation to cover such uses, but the cases examined for this article were more reserved. Also, as illustrated here, the courts are heavily influenced by confusion when
assessing common law passing off, which is not the case of some of the statutory provisions considered below.
Ibid. at para. 131.
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With respect to confusion, the second question in Macaw’s analysis, the BCAA
ruling is more problematic. On the one hand, the court, like Macaw, emphasized
that a defendant (here, a labour union) may have valid reasons to use an owner’s
mark to reach people. It said, “if a site wishes to operate as a lawful vehicle during
a strike or as a consumer criticism site, it must be able to reach people who are
attempting to find an employer’s or a producer’s site.”91 But, on the other hand, the
court ruled that the defendant’s site that did constitute passing did so because it was
initially confusing to a hurried observer, although this confusion would likely dissipate after “starting to examine the site.”92 Canadian authors Bradley J. Freedman
and Robert J.C. Deane take this to mean that the court ruled on the basis of initial
confusion alone,93 and indeed the court did consider American cases that had
adopted the initial interest confusion concept, e.g. Brookfield. If so, the BCAA ruling may be inconsistent with Macaw’s thesis because he is adamant that trademark
use must result in literal and not fleeting confusion. Teresa Scassa, however, is of a
different view. She focuses on the court’s comments regarding the site it found
permissible and concludes that “[i]nitial interest confusion alone is . . . unlikely to
be a sufficient basis for passing off. A more substantial level of confusion is required.”94 She also notes the expansionary aspect of initial interest confusion arguments and, like Macaw, opines that it should properly form part of a “more general
test for confusion.”95
Perhaps some weight should be given to the judge’s concluding remark: “I
conclude that there would likely be confusion sufficient to constitute the tort of
passing-off.”96 At what point does confusion reach the passing off threshold? It is
clear that the bar is set below actual confusion but, if one accepts Macaw’s approach, it must be set above mere initial interest confusion, at a level that would
trouble the user. It is not clear on what basis the court in BCAA held that one of the
defendant’s sites constituted passing off but, given that the court found that the site
had been designed to mislead (the court noted that it prominently displayed the
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Ibid. at para. 128.
Ibid. at para. 212.
Bradley J. Freedman & Robert J.C. Deane, “Trade-marks and the Internet: A Canadian
Perspective” (2001) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 345 at para. 88 (QL).
Teresa Scassa, “Intellectual Property on the Cyber-Picket Line: A Comment on British
Columbia Automobile Ass. v. Office and Professional Employees’ International Union,
Local 378” (2002) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 934 at at para. 14 (QL).
Ibid. However, Scassa also opines that initial confusion interest becomes actionable
when it results in a loss of business, an argument with which one might take issue.
Imagine Seller A has a sponsored link triggered by Seller B’s trademark and the court
finds, at first glance, that sponsored links appear to be affiliated with their corresponding trademark owners. Imagine that the court also found the disclaimer in place sufficient to dispel any real confusion. If Seller A makes a legitimate claim about its product vis-à-vis that of Seller B and, after recovering from their initial confusion, buyers
choose Seller A out of preference and not confusion, there should be no finding of
passing off, despite the diversion.
Supra note 87 at para. 212.
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plaintiff’s logo, etc.),97 it is plausible that the ruling may have been based on more
than initial interest confusion. It is also important to note that BCAA was not a case
involving two sellers but rather an employer and a union. As such, users would
almost always distinguish between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s websites because
the services they offered were fundamentally different; in order to hold the defendant liable for its intentional deceit, the court had to lower the confusion bar. It
may, therefore, be consistent with the BCAA ruling to raise the bar well away from
mere initial interest confusion where two sellers are involved, except where deceit
was intentional but somehow failed to create the potential for confusion.
It should be noted that the court said in obiter that it would be more critical of
a business competitor trying to use metatags as the union did on its permissible
site.98 It is unclear whether the court meant that the potential for confusion is
greater between competitors and therefore (as a matter of fact) is easier to confuse
their sites, or whether it meant (as a matter of law) that such metatag use is less
socially desirable in the commercial context than in the labour dispute context, lowering the confusion bar. The former interpretation is preferable in that it is more
consistent with Macaw’s thesis.

(b) Keying and the Trade-marks Act
The next issue, then, is whether the Trade-marks Act99 complements the common law foundation, outlined above, or whether it pushes Canadian law away from
Macaw’s thesis. Sections 7(b), 19, 20, and 22 are of interest, and will be addressed
sequentially.

(i) Section 7(b)
Section 7(b) has been held to essentially codify the common law passing off
tort that nominally prohibits a seller from “direct[ing] public attention to his wares
. . . in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, at the time
he commenced so to direct attention to them, between his wares . . . and the wares
. . . of another.” In considering 7(b) claims, the courts’ analyses have been heavily
informed by the elements of the common law passing off,100 but the statutory language has given rise to some differences between the two causes of action, the
extent of which are subject to debate. For instance, it has been suggested that the
broad language of “direct public attention” may mean that section 7(b) does not
require any misrepresentation as such. Such a reading would put an end to the concern raised above, although it may also lower the confusion threshold below literal
confusion,101 blurring its desirability. Unlike common law passing off, statutory
actions can certainly be brought in Federal Court, which is desirable because it
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Ibid. at paras. 211-12.
Ibid. at para. 126ff.
99 Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
100 See Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. / Gestions Ritvik Inc., 2005 SCC 65, ¶62, [2005]
3 S.C.R. 302 (S.C.C.).
101 Professor Bita Amani (Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, 2008).
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eliminates the need for plaintiffs trying to police keying abuses (which tend to span
jurisdictions) to launch multiple actions in different provinces.

(ii) Sections 19, 20, and 22
Sections 19, 20, and 22 all depend on the plaintiff’s trademark having been
“used” for the purposes of the Act. With respect to wares, section 4 deems a trademark to have been “used” when, at the time of sale or transfer “in the normal
course of trade”,102 it is “marked on the wares” or in any other way associated with
them such that “notice of the association” is given to the recipient. With respect to
services, a trademark is deemed to have been used if it is “used or displayed in the
performance or advertising of those services.”
The language is, prima facie, broad and potentially problematic. In Playboy
Enterprises v. Germain, the Federal Court had to determine whether verbally
describing goods as “Playboy” hairpieces constituted use of that mark for the purposes of registration. The presiding judge opined, “[U]se of a verbal description is
not use of a trade mark within the meaning of the Trade Marks Act. A ‘mark’ must
be something that can be represented visually.” The judge added, however, “the
‘mark’ can be associated with the wares (and still be visible) otherwise than by
being marked on the wares themselves or on the packages in which the wares are
distributed.”103 Like Macaw, who argues that keying is visually perceptible because the user associates the marks that she entered with the search results that she
obtains, the Germain ruling suggests that, although using a word for the purposes
of registration requires more than its oral invocation, associating that word with a
good can be achieved by means other than direct affixation. The definition does
contain some internal limitations, such as the requirement that the mark be used at
the point of transfer. However, although not exactly contemporaneous, many users
now shop, contract, and exchange title online through websites that they may have
found by searching for a trademarked keyword, and it is not clear whether the point
of transfer restriction would present a serious obstacle to defining keying as use.
Moreover, the definition of use with respect to services is particularly broad and
would seem to catch all sponsored links with respect to services because they are
essentially advertisements, comparative advertisement though they may be.
If exported to sections 19, 20 and 22, the above reading of use would virtually
prohibit comparative advertising by means of AdWords. Section 19 grants a seller
who registers a mark with respect to certain goods the exclusive right to use that
mark in relation to those goods. Because it only applies when Seller A uses an
unregistered mark identical to Seller B’s registered mark, and only when that use
directs buyers to the same wares or services specified in Seller B’s registration,
section 19 is the narrowest of the three provisions. But, it alone would be enough to
severely curtail AdWords given a plain reading of “use” because sellers typically
bid on textual trademarks as they are registered, and the provision is also a concern
in that its application does not explicitly depend on consumer confusion.

102 Note that the Lanham Act, supra note 30 also specifies the commercial context.
103 See e.g. Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Germain (1987), 16 C.P.R. (3d) 517 (Fed. T.D.) at

paras. 10, 14 (WL) [Germain].
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Fortunately, the Exchequer Court took a much narrower view in the leading
case of Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co.104 Although focusing on the definition of use with respect to goods, the court read section 4 in light of the definition of a trademark found in section 2: a mark is something “used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing . . . wares or services . . .
sold, [etc.] by him from those . . . sold, [etc.] by others. . . .” Accordingly, the court
interpreted section 19 as granting an “exclusive right to the use of such mark in
association with such wares or services within the meaning of sections [2 and 4] for
the purpose of the trade mark. . . .”105 In a sense, the court combined the issues of
“use” and “confusion” by ruling that only certain kinds of use — namely where
Seller B uses Seller A’s registered mark as an identifier of source — violate section
19, thereby subsuming the notion of confusion that Macaw advocates; a use of this
sort surely risks actual confusion.
Section 20 — the infringement provision — is broader in that it prohibits confusing marks (not just identical ones) in association with any wares or services.
However, it never was as great a concern as section 19 because it imports the notion of confusion as defined in section 6. One court explained that the crucial question is whether “casual consumers somewhat in a hurry are likely to be deceived
about the origin of the wares or services.”106 The statutory definition of confusion
as expressed above appears to depend on literal confusion, which is consistent with
Macaw’s thesis. No instance of a Canadian court deciding an Internet-related case
based on initial interest confusion was identified in preparing this article. Moreover, the Federal Court of Canada in Cie générale des établissements Michelin —
Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada explicitly states that the Clairol approach to use
applies to section 20, meaning that, regardless of whether Canadian courts receive
the concept of initial interest confusion enthusiastically or not, use for the purposes
of section 20 must be to identify source.107
On its surface, section 22 appears to resemble section 19. It states: “No person
shall use a trade-mark registered by another person in a matter that is likely to have
the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching thereto.” In other
words, it does not require confusion either, but rather use of the same mark. However, it differs from section 19 in that said use can be in relation to any wares or
services, and application of the provision is dependent on the dilution of goodwill.
It is the most worrying of the three provisions because, in addition to not requiring
104 [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552 (Can. Ex. Ct.) (WL) [Clairol].
105 Ibid. at 29 [emphasis added].
106 Mattel U.S.A. Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, ¶58, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772

(S.C.C.).
107 Cie générale des établissements Michelin — Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada (1996),

1996 CarswellNat 2297, [1997] 2 F.C. 306 (Fed. T.D.) at para. 26 (WL). Section 20
also excepts bona fide uses that accurately describes the character or quality of the nonowner’s wares (which captured comparative advertising), providing that said use
neither uses trademark as a mark (which may sometimes capture AdWords) nor depreciates the owner’s goodwill. The latter condition, however, is troubling because legitimate comparison with or critical reviews of a ware can reduced the goodwill associated
with its mark, but this problem will be addressed in the more frequently discussed
context of section 22.
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confusion, the Exchequer Court in Clairol broadened the definition of use to include more than mere identification of source,108 which effectively eliminated the
need for any sort of confusion for the purpose of the section. That being said, the
court also distinguished between comparative advertising affixed to a good (in this
case, a comparison chart using the plaintiff’s trademark printed on the defendant’s
packaging) in general and comparative advertisements found elsewhere (in this
case, a promotional brochure displaying the same chart). The court acknowledged
that the language of section 22 is “broad enough to include a conversation in which
a person aversely criticizes a good”,109 and applied it as follows:
[A seller] may not put his competitor’s trade mark on his goods . . . for the
purpose of appealing to his competitor’s customers in his effort to weaken
their habit of buying what they have brought [sic] before . . . so as to secure
the custom [sic] for himself.110

On this basis, the court held that the defendant’s packaging violated section
22, but not its brochures. In Syntex Inc. v. Apotex Inc., the Federal Court of Appeal
reinforced this distinction by discharging, based on Clairol, an injunction that had
been granted against a drug company that had used the plaintiff’s trademark in its
flyer.111 AdWords may be akin to the brochure and flyer: although it may depreciate the plaintiff’s goodwill, the trademarks it uses are not affixed to any wares.
Therefore, there is cause for hope that a properly disclaimed sponsored link could
survive a section 22 challenge, but some doubt endures, particularly with respect to
services advertised through sponsored links. American jurisprudence considering
the dilution provision of the Lanham Act with respect to keying — a related but
broader concept112 — may also have an impact if and when it becomes available.

CONCLUSION
It would seem that the common law tort of passing off, as it has developed in
Canada, offers a tool fairly well adapted to the challenge of policing keying on the
Internet. The tort originated in an era when the courts were more suspicious of
granting property rights in language, and perhaps it should not surprise us that the
balance it strikes leans towards the traditionalist camp. The younger Trade-marks
Act exhibits expansionist features that could curtail keying and, indeed, comparative advertising overall. But Canadian courts have been comparatively constrained

108 Supra note 104 at para. 37:

No person shall use in association with ware within the meaning of
section 4 a mark that is used by another person for the purpose of
distinguishing or so as to distinguish wares manufactured etc. by him
from the manufactured etc. by others and which mark has been registered by him as his trade mark, in a manner likely to depreciate the
value of the goodwill attaching thereto.

See also Scassa, supra note 94 at para. 30.
109 Ibid. at para. 36.
110 Ibid. at para. 44.
111 [1984] 2 F.C. 1012 (Fed. C.A.).
112 Freedman & Deane, supra note 93 at para. 33.
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in applying those provisions, and their rulings to date appear to be consistent with
Macaw’s thesis. That is, keying is subject to the disciplines of trademark law, but
the courts are unlikely to intervene unless they perceive that buyer confusion is
likely. This article does not attempt to assess whether AdWords, as it exists now, is
confusing, but Macaw notes that a clearer disclaimer could dispel whatever confusion it does create, meaning that keying and the efficiencies it offers are likely
legal. As a concluding remark, however, it is worth noting again that very few
Canadian decisions have considered metatags, and none have considered keying. It
remains to be seen whether future cases will take a more expansionist approach,
particularly with respect to initial interest confusion, as many American courts have
done before them, or whether they will develop anything resembling a nominative
fair use defense.
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Appendix A: — One Possible Breakdown of the
Jurisprudence113
Brookfield Communication v. West Coast Entertainment114
Date: 1999.
Court: Ninth Circuit.
Overview: Parties offered a service in common (movie
database); the defendant used a metatag comprised on
plaintiff’s public name plus “.com”; court held there was a
likelihood of infringement and granted a summary judgment in part.
Use?: Not assessed.
Confusion?: The court found that that confusion between
the parties was not necessary; to grant a preliminary injunction, it was enough that buyers might have been diverted to the defendant, which would be an illegitimate
use of the plaintiff’s goodwill (initial interest confusion).115
Dilution?: The court deemed the issue waived because the
plaintiff did not address dilution in its opening brief.116
Not followed in: Welles (distinguished), Wells Fargo (distinguished), Contacts (distinguished), Rescuecom (distinguished).
↓
Playboy Entertainment v. Netscape Communication117
Date: 2004.
Court: Ninth Circuit.
Overview: Defendant required adult entertainment advertisers using its banner ads system to link their ads to
the keywords “playboy” and “playmate”; the banner ads
were confusingly labeled or not labeled.
Use?: The court emphasized that the defendant had benefited from the plaintiff’s goodwill,118 but otherwise did not
consider use.
Confusion?: The court, per the reasoning in Brookfield,
said it could likely deny the defendant summary judgment
based on an initial confusion analysis alone, but ultimately
did so using a multifactor test (Sleekcraft) for confusion;119
using the 3 factor test (New Kids), the
court found that the nominal fair use defense was not
available to the defendant because the defendant had not
compared itself to anything about the plaintiff in particular, and because the defendant could have used other descriptive words.120
Dilution?: A trial would have been necessary to determine
whether the plaintiff’s trademark was famous, one of the
three elements of a dilution action;121 but it was no defense that the defendant had not labeled its service with

Playboy Entertainment v. Welles123
Date: 2002.
Court: Ninth Circuit.
Overview: Former Playboy playmate
truthfully used “playboy” and “playmate” as metatags; the court did not
hold the defendant liable for infringement.
Use?: Not assessed.
Confusion?: Instead of using a multifactor test for confusion (Sleekcraft),
the court found that the defendant was
not liable for infringement based on a 3
factor nominative fair use test (New
Kids); to use a confusion test would
“lead to the incorrect conclusion that
virtually all nominative uses are confusing”; in requiring that another’s trademark be used descriptively where
necessary, the nominative test also filters out confusing uses.124
Dilution?: By acknowledging that she
was indeed once a playmate, the defendant did not dilute the trademark.125
Not followed in: Netscape (distinguished).
↓
WhenU.Com Cases: All three cases
stem from the defendant, WhenU.Com,
providing software that produced popup
windows depending on the webpage the
user visited. The owners of webpages
with which the defendant had associated third party advertisements sued.

1. U-Haul International v.
WhenU.com126 was no use of the
trademark:
(1) the popups generated were distinct from the plaintiff’s website, (2)
the fact that the user could see another trademark in the popup at the
same time she could see the plaintiff’s trademark on its website does

113 For a good overview of much of the Internet-related trademark jurisprudence, see

generally Macaw, supra note 2.
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the plaintiff’s mark; the connection was made implicitly in
the user’s mind.122
Not followed in: Contacts (distinguished), Rescuecom
(distinguished).
↓
↓
Government Employees InGoogle v. American Blind
& Wallpaper Factory155
surance v. Google144
Date: 2004.
Date: 2005
Court: District Court (Vir.). Court: District Court (Cal.)
Overview: AdWords lawOverview: AdWords lawsuit.
suit.
Use?: The court declined
Use?: The court approvingthe approach taken in Uly cited the Netscape judgHaul and Wells Fargo (the
ment’s focus on goodwill
first two WhenU.com
and did not seriously probe
cases), and adopted instead
the issue.156
the Netscape approach;145 it Confusion?: The court apfound that the defendant
plied the reasoning found in
had used the plaintiff’s
Netscape and denied the detrademark because the use
fendant’s motion to dismiss
was not internal or merely
the case; there was adepart of the defendant’s tech- quate initial interest confunical operations, but rather
sion to warrant further fact
the mark had been sold,
finding at trial to determine
which might have implied
whether there was indeed a
that the mark’s owner had
risk of confusion.157
somehow endorsed the pur- Dilution?: Again, the court
chaser; the court also high- followed the reasoning in
lighted that the defendant
Netscape, noting that affixamay have improperly profit- tion of the trademark to a
ed from the plaintiff’s
good or service was not
necessary for a finding of
goodwill.146
Confusion?: The court endilution.158
dorsed the Brookfield prog- Not followed in:
Rescuecom (declined).
eny without explanation.147
The Harvard Journal of
Law and Technology reports, however, that in an
oral ruling, the same court
later dismissed the direct
infringement claim against
the defendant because, as
the sponsored links had not
displayed the plaintiff’s
mark, there was insufficient
evidence of confusion; the
court reserved its decision
on contributory liability.148
Macaw reports that the
court endorsed the Brookfield/Netscape
approach to confusion,
focusing on diversion rather
than a multipart test for
confusion (Lone Star).149
Not followed in:
Rescuecom (disagreed),
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not establish infringement because
comparative advertising is permissible, (3) the popups did not display
the plaintiff’s trademark, and
(4) the popups did not impede the
user from visiting the plaintiff’s
website.127
Dilution?: The court ruled that there
was no dilution because there was
no use.128
Not followed in: Geico (declined).
2. Wells Fargo v. When U.com129
Date: 2003.
Court: District Court (Mich.).
Use?: In denying the plaintiff an injunction, the court held that the defendant had not used the plaintiff’s
trademark: (1) the popups did no
impede the user from visiting the
plaintiff’s website, (2) the popups
generated were distinct from the
plaintiff’s website, and (3) the
popup was a legitimate form of
comparative advertising.130
Did not follow: Geico (declined).
3. 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU.com131
Date: 2005.
Court: Second Circuit.
Use?: The court held that the defendant had not used the plaintiff’s
mark: (1) the defendant had not attached the mark to a good or service,132 (2) the defendant had not
displayed the mark publicly,133 (3)
the plaintiff’s name had been used
as a URL and not as a trademark,134
and (4) the use had been internal
and not displayed to the public.135
In doing so, the court overturned the
trial court’s finding that profiting
from the goodwill attached to another seller’s trademark and creating
initial interest confusion between
oneself and that seller (the trial
court had noted that the popups
came up simultaneously with the
plaintiff’s website) constituted use.
Not followed in: Unrelated cases.
↓
Rescuecom v. Google136
Date: 2006.
Court: District Court (N.Y.).
Use?: “Use” constitutes a threshold that
must be reached before the court can
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Contacts (distinguished)
Dilution?: Not addressed.
↓
800-JR Cigar v.
GoTo.com150
Date: 2005.
Court: District Court (N.J.).
Overview: The defendant, a
search engine, sold trademarks as keywords, and it
suggested additional
keywords, some of which
were also trademarks.
Use?: Following Geico, the
court found that the defendant had used the plaintiff’s
mark because it had (1)
traded in the value of the
marks, (2) entered the
plaintiff/defendant’s marketplace by ranking its sponsored links ahead of its
organic ones, thereby potentially redirecting users, and
(3) suggested, of its own
accord, keywords that were
trademarks.151
Confusion?: The court applied a multi-factor test
(Lapp factors) for confusion
and found that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
trademark was potentially
confusing because of the relationship in created in the
user’s mind between the
mark and the defendant’s
wares;152 however, some elements of the test, as well
as the issue of initial interest confusion, which the
court considered separately,
required a trial, and the
court denied both parties
summary judgment on the
infringement issue.153
Dilution?: The court ruled
that confusion, actual or
likely, was an element of
dilution, and that the issue
had to go to trial.154
Not followed in:
Rescuecom (declined).

Notes:
114.

Supra note 42.
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consider confusion;137 here there was no
use: (1) the plaintiff’s
trademark was not affixed to any
good or service,138 (2) the sponsored
link did not affect the organic search
results and did not visibly contain the
plaintiff’s trademark,139 and (3) the
sponsored links did not prevent users
from viewing the plaintiff’s website.140
Confusion?: Confusion was not at issue
because there was no finding of “use.”
The court did observe that free riding
on the goodwill of another’s mark was
not sufficient for a finding of infringement.141 However, the court also stated
that, at first glance, people might have
assumed that the topmost sponsored
link is the most relevant search result.142
Dilution?: The court ruled that there
was no dilution because there was no
use.143
Not followed in: Unrelated cases.
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